3 Apr. 2015
Introducing the Hitch and Hitchens/Sagan Proposition
Do unbelievers have double standards as it concerns questions relating to the Christian religion? Christopher Hitchens (a.k.a., “The Hitch”) was known for his quips (a.k.a., “Hitchslap,” in his case) in debates and speeches. One that I have read over and over again on online forums is the proposition that “Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.”
[Note: This may actually have been a quote from Carl Sagan, even though it is sometimes attributed to Hitchens. However, this is not the Hitchen’s Razor, which is a different saying.]
This claim is generally levied against claims of reported miracles, including the resurrection of Jesus Christ.
Now, at first, we must recognize that the proposition is itself a claim, and that, as such, we might be justified in asking whether the proponents of the claim actually have evidence to support their claim. In the very least, even though there is an element of “ought” in the proposition, there arguably should still be some “is” (real evidence, in this case) to give a hint (when combined with human ethics reasoning) for the “ought.” After all, we can rephrase the proposition into an expanded form, wherein the proposition becomes, “we ought to accept extraordinary claims if extraordinary evidence supports such claims.”
But the Hitchens (or Sagan) proposition, as a claim…. is it also extraordinary? If so, then one must have extraordinary evidence to back it up. Otherwise, we should not accept it
Personally, I find the statement to be extraordinary, since I should only need adequate or necessary evidence, not necessarily extraordinary evidence, to substantiate extraordinary claims. Now, in the course of the debate, courtesy of another Christian apologist, I found this meme concerning extraordinary evidence.
Does your evidence glow in the dark? Our extraordinary evidence does, so there!
Oh sure, on a more serious note, we can argue all day about what is really extraordinary. In fact, the term itself is a bit subjective. So what is extraordinary to you might not be extraordinary to me, and vice versa. Yeah, I went there. Truth is not relative to the person, generally speaking; but the property of extraordinariness likely is. In the very least, it is comparative against what is “ordinary.” So, if “ordinary” is a subjective term, then so is “extraordinary.”
With “ordinary common sense” apparently getting less common and ordinary by the minute, we have to conclude that arguing from such subjective terms is going to get us nowhere fast.
Now, if we take the wording “extraordinary claims” to mean “claims of the supernatural,” then it stands to reason that we ought to also take “extraordinary evidence” as “evidence of the supernatural,” unless someone is using figurative language here. If this is what is meant by the version of evidence desired, rather than “supernaturally delivered evidence,” then we might find agreement.
However, in one sense, the natural is simply an effect of the supernatural (within the theist paradigm). So… then the question comes, “What qualifies as evidence of the supernatural?”
For the theist, this is virtually everything, since everything natural is basically an effect of the supernatural, indirectly or directly. If we go that route, we have transitioned in this discussion from Evidential to Presuppositional grounds. In other words, we have gone off the reservation.
Now, while we are talking about presuppositions, it is of note that a few do not feel like the atheist will come out of his presuppositions through using such a proposition. On the one hand, “extraordinary claims” require evidence which the atheist will accept as convincing. On the other hand, in the process of being convinced, the evidence appears to be ordinary because the circumstances surrounding that evidence appear understandable or ordinary.
So before the full weight of a powerful argument is fully grasped, the argument is rejected as including only ordinary evidence. Could this sort of thing be circular reasoning “predicated on a priori criterion of acceptable evidence”? In other words, for instance, could the atheist really have particular presuppositions (that he or she will not concede to the theist) which actually prohibit the atheist from fully accepting an argument for the historicity of miracles?
The Temptation
The temptation in responding to the Hitchens proposition is to use a snarky tone or simply retort back with something that others may find unrelated. When someone promotes the Hichens Proposition, one could reply with, “So, when are we going to discuss the topic of abiogenesis and the likelihood that it was unintelligently caused?” Another temptation is to retort back with the question to the atheist, “Are you willing to do extraordinary research or an extraordinary amount of research to discover that extraordinary evidence?” Personally, while this may be good wit, I don’t think it will progress the discussion in a substantial way. Some may even take it as an implied jab at their diligence and work ethic.
A Brief Aside: Archaeology and What Not
Now, much of what we learn about ancient history we learn at least partly thanks to archaeology. Ruins are dug up. Manuscripts are discovered. Votive figures are identified. Teeth are examined for leprosy. Issues of evidence go beyond simply what one believes to be extraordinary or not.
In one discussion I once had online, one person told me, “Historical evidence does not trump scientific evidence.”
Now, I usually have different categorizations for things than do many other people that I’ve met. My categorization of evidence might have differed from the person with which I was discussing. However, one cannot do a scientific experiment outside of history. Neither do scientific facts trump historical facts. Rather, scientific evidence is a particular version of historical evidence.
Once more, arguments from silence are generally not scientific arguments. Now, mathematics can prove absence in particular situations, but repeat experimentation or observation alone generally cannot. What all this suggests is that we must be increasingly careful concerning how we use our terminology and what versions of evidence we esteem over others. Confusion needs to be eliminated.
Counter-claim: Ordinary Evidence for Extraordinary Claims
Now, in one sense, it may appear that all evidence is ordinary, whether it is scientific evidence or other evidence. After all, all real evidence is historical in some sense. So, some would counter the claim that “extraordinary evidence” must go with “extraordinary claims” with the response that ordinary evidence can work quite well.
Given our background knowledge of gravitation, for example, a claim that a car rolls up a hill when put in neutral might be an extraordinary claim. But what evidence would prove it? Ordinary evidence. Observe that car on that hill, and then measure the hill at various points in the route to determine whether or not an optical illusion was to blame.
In this paradigm, seeing is believing if one were disbelieving before. The man who claims to have a pet cat with three eyes will be believed when the cat is shown (with his three eyes on her).
However, this rebuttal against the proposition that extraordinary claims requiring extraordinary evidence, while offering us a way to put evidence against the proposition, does not get down to the real point.
The Formula Underlying the Claim
So let’s get more to the point, shall we?
Now, the claim that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence is generally paired up with the implication that ordinary claims require ordinary evidence. But if this is so, then it appears we may either have a subjective bias (in using “extraordinary” as a term to arbitrarily demand more evidence for some claims than others) or are implying that there is a formulaic basis upon which we made our claims about extraordinary claims.
The formula underlying the claim that “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence” goes like this:
For every Q version of claim, in order for us to believe that the claim is true, we must require Q version of evidence.
If this is the reason someone would push this slogan, then Houston, we have a problem.
Why? Then imbecilic and absurd claims require imbecilic or absurd evidence. Don’t believe me? Plug it in like you would with a math equation.
For every absurd version of claim, in order for us to believe that the claim is true, we must require an absurd version of evidence.
Now, suppose I make the claim that “I have patented more inventions than Thomas Edison.” This is an absurd statement (and demonstrably false, I might add). Why should anyone take that claim seriously? But, if we apply that formula, we are justified in believing that claim if we give absurd evidence. So, now, suppose I then show you ten thousand certificates of patents that simply have the words “I have patented another invention” on them. That sort of evidence would be absurd. Where are the other marks of authenticity from any sort of patent office?
But if we applied the formula, my absurd evidence would justify my claim to have patented more inventions. Of course, I don’t seriously make that sort of claim for myself. More seriously, some have asked that, under such a formula, “What would it take in order for someone to believe a false claim?” According to the formula, if I believe in false propositions based on the false evidence I have received, then I am justified in believing those false propositions.
Where then, pray tell me, is my obligation to do fact-checking? Such an obligation wouldn’t exist!
Speaking of fact checking, the whole “Is this quote from C. Sagan or C. Hitchens?” comes to mind.
Again, it is asked, who seriously does this? Who thinks, for example, that the ancient philosopher Plato was Japanese based upon testimony they knew was false? No one. As many in the Christian Apologetics Alliance would admit, the formula has been “reduced to absurdity,” and as such, we can dismiss it.
Bayesian Theorem Applied to the Formula
Believe it or not, on at least one occasion, someone desired to know in the Christian Apologetics Alliance the relationship between Bayes Theorem and the Hitchens (or Sagan) proposition.
Bayesian Theorem includes elements of background info and hence prior probability. Bayesian Theorem, according to those in the know, follows from standard Kolmogorov axioms of probability. The Theorem, which can be expressed as a sort of equation, demonstrates how certain probabilities must be related in order to have a consistent, coherent set of probability assignments. With a few additional, somewhat questionable assumptions, we might be able to derive from Bayesian Theorem a principle for justifiably changing our beliefs. In short, by using Bayesian Theorem, we can update our readings from the probabilities we measure whenever new evidence arises.
But if we can do this for any new evidence, why should we ever restrict the evidence we consider to being “extraordinary evidence only”? After all, “extraordinary evidence” can only be a subset of all relevant evidence. Would accepting “extraordinary evidence” as a minimum requirement not result in us limiting our epistemology? Would we not need some sort of justification for limiting our epistemology in such a way?
Since I am not in support of the Proposition, I am not going to task myself with the obligation to demonstrate that someone would be justified in limiting one’s epistemology that way. This especially since I perceive the term “extraordinary” to be rather subjective (at least until it is narrowly defined by some sort of criteria).
Perhaps it is best to avoid the rhetoric altogether and stick with what we know will work, philosophically speaking. Extraordinary evidence may have more weight than ordinary evidence, but ordinary evidence should not be dismissed out of hand, simply on the grounds that it is ordinary.
Our Conclusion
Ordinary claims require sufficient evidence. Extraordinary claims require sufficient evidence. Let’s not have a double standard here.
What, you say you don’t believe that? Well, should ordinary claims require insufficient evidence? Should extraordinary claims require insufficient evidence?
Surely, it should suffice us to believe in a proposition that is sufficiently evidenced. After all, we certainly do not need to go above and beyond sufficient evidence, by definition. We may choose to do so to let a point sink in, but really, what is unnecessary to arrive at a conclusion is unnecessary.
While this wording about sufficient evidence only really gets us one step forward, it does refute the Hitchens Proposition, and offers us a breath of sanity when combined with the admonition to use some specific, objective criteria when testing claims. I apologize if this seemed like a rant to you, or me being pedantic. Sometimes my English training comes out like the Hulk, ready to smash.
Bibliography:
Adrian Urias. “Do Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence?” The Christian Vanguard. 6 Oct. 2012. http://christianvanguard.blogspot.com/2012/10/do-extraordinary-claims-require.html?m=0. Accessed 3 Apr. 2015. Web.
AvT (“Atheist vs. Theist: The God Debate” social media forum)
CAA (Christian Apologetics Alliance, including notes and themes by Adrian U., Lyle E., Nick P., Retha F., Tim M., etc.).
Matt Slick. “Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence.” https://carm.org/extraordinary-claims-require-extraordinary-evidence. Accessed 3 Apr. 2015. Web.
Permalinks: 1619550781605770, 1674766316084216, and current link.
Quotations not used with attribution here, as I have not gone to the lengths to warrant citation. Most have simply been paraphrased. Also, you may be interested in reading this apologetics testimonial from Nick Peters:
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